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HANDLING CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE OF
MINNESOTA
LESLIE L. ANDERSON*
I.
The Minnesota Legislature, in 1955, waived the immunity of
the state from suit on its contracts and created a State Claims
Commission to which other claims against the state could be sub-
mitted." The commission was declared to be a "special instrumen-
tality of the legislature." 2 It consisted of five commissioners: two
selected by the committee on committees of the senate, two by the
speaker of the house, and these four were empowered to name the
fifth member. Legislators were ineligible for appointment to the
commission, but two members of each house of the legislature were
to be selected to advise the commission and to investigate claims
and make recommendations. Jurisdiction was conferred upon the
district courts over contract cases.8 Passage of this statute was
prompted in part by action of the State Bar Association, which
strongly recommended that the state waive its immunity from suit
in both contract and tort. The resulting statute was a compromise
measure, permitting litigation against the state on its contracts only
with the commission created to consider other claims. It was an
advanced step in democratic government.
However, in 1957 the legislature eliminated the State Claims
Commission, repealed the right to sue the state generally on its
contracts, and created what it chose to call "a commission to hear
and adjudicate claims against the state."'4 Personnel of this new
commission were six in number: three senators appointed by the
committee on committees and three representatives appointed by
the speaker of the house. The functions and procedures of this
commission remained substantially the same as those of the 1955
commission.r
*Judge of District Court, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. L. Minn. 1955, c. 878.
2. Id.§3.
3. Id.§2.
4. L. Minn. 1957, c. 899.
5. Both commissions were to select their own officers. The director of
research of the legislative research committee was designated the clerk for each.
The state capitol was particularized as the regular meeting place for each of
the commissions, and authority was given in each statute to hear claims arising
elsewhere in the state at any county seat. The 1957 commission may hear
claims for injury or death of an inmate of a state penal institution and those
arising out of the care or treatment of a person in a state institution, a juris-
diction not granted to its predecessor. L. Minn. 1957, c. 899, § 9(4)-(5). The
Governor or head of a state agency, moreover, may refer claims to the com-
mission for an advisory determination. Id. § 13.
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In and of itself, the conclusion seems inescapable that the 1957
statute was a step backward in the field of progressive democratic
government. Not only was the right to sue the state on its con-
tracts revoked, but the new legislative commission was given a
broad jurisdiction to hear claims and demands against the state or
any of its agencies. The commission was empowered to consider
claims which the state "should in equity and good conscience dis-
charge and pay." This, of course, goes beyond anything that the
bar association had recommended. The words can be made to mean
many things. To the extent that this provision permits determina-
tion of claims other than those allowable according to rules of law,
the courts certainly are not in a position to handle them; and there
could hardly be a right of appeal, if the law did permit it, on a
judicial basis. For the legislature to authorize determination of such
broad claims by other than legislators approaches the borderline
of abdication of the legislative function.
Two factors were detectable that seemed to make the legislature
hesitant to waive the immunity of the state from suit. One was the
commendable insistence on the part of legislators not to unduly
loosen their control over state expenditures and appropriations. The
other was the probability that permitting suit in tort and contract
against the state would create more problems for the office of the
attorney general than it had facilities to handle.
But neither of these grounds for hesitancy has tenable validity
in relation to suit against the state on its own contracts. In the first
place, no contract with the state is valid until the legislature has
given authority to enter into it.7 In that way alone, the legislature
retains control over appropriations and expenditures whether rights
under the contract in event of dispute are determined by a court,
a commission, or a legislative committee. 8 If the state chooses to
enter into a legal bargain, it certainly is under a moral compunction
to hold itself open to the same procedures for determination of its
obligations as it expects to use, if necessary, to assert its rights
6. L. Minn. 1957, c. 899, § 9(1).
7. "We have no officers in this government, from the President down to
the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with pre-
scribed duties and limited authority. And while some of these, as the Presi-
dent, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, exercise powers in some sense left
to the more general definitions necessarily incident to fundamental law found
in the Constitution, the larger portion of them are the creation of statutory
law, duties and powers prescribed and limited by that law." Miller, J., The
Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666, 676-77 (1868).
8. "It is a fundamental principle of our form of government that the
Legislature, which is the appropriating branch, has sole power to authorize the
payment of claims against the Commonwealth." George .A. Fuller Co. v. Com-
monwealth, 303 Mass. 216, 220, 21 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1939).
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against the contracting party. This ought to be a factor in the state's
getting better bargains. It should reduce the risks to contractors
and better protect the public.
Further, since Minnesota waives its immunity from suit in con-
troversies arising out of its contracts for the construction or repair
of its trunk highways,9 a semblance of evil appears in the state select-
ing with which of its bargains it will assume normal legal respon-
sibility. Regardless of whether determination of controversies by
a legislative committee is intended to be political rather than
according to actual legal right, it is regarded by people as political.
Regardless of the integrity of the persons who make these deter-
minations, something appears lacking in the integrity of a procedure
in which agents of the very person against whom the claim is made
are to determine finally whether the claim will be allowed or not.
It is submitted that all progress in the field of claims against govern-
ment, considered in the light of democracy's meaning, must be
made in the direction of permitting grievances to be determined as
matters of right.
The issue of governmental immunity is not, however, closed in
Minnesota. The 1957 legislature created an interim commission to
examine the lower court system of Minnesota, and "to study and
investigate the best method of handling claims against the state."10
This commission is made up of fifteen members: five state senators,
five representatives, and five members of the Minnesota State Bar
Association. Qualifications of the men selected are of the highest.
Lawyers, judges, teachers and the public generally have been in-
vited to contribute their views to the interim commission on this
subject. This paper will investigate and evaluate some of the alterna-
tive methods of dealing with claims against the State of Minnesota.
II.
It is almost hackneyed to repeat that the claim of governmental
immunity from suit is lifted from the philosophy that the king can
do no wrong," notwithstanding the fact that even dictatorships and
9. Minn. Stat. §§ 161.03(17)-(20) (1953). At the election of the
plaintiff, the action may be brought in Ramsey county, or in the county
where the major portion of the contract is performed, or in the county where
the plaintiff resides, or, if several plaintiffs of varying counties, in the district
court of the county of any one of them. Id. § 161.03(19).
10. L. Minn. 1957, c. 951.
11. Mr. Justice Holmes indicated in The Western Maid that the govern-
ment cannot be a wrongdoer because it makes the law. 257 U.S. 419 (1922).
He said in Kawananakoa v. Polybank: "A sovereign is exempt from suit ...
on the ... ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends." 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
1958]
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monarchies frequently p~rmit such litigation. The argument to the
effect that the processing of claims should be handled by legislative
committees because that is the traditionally-accepted method by
which such claims are processed, is equally untenable.
Although at the time that both the federal and Minnesota gov-
ernments were established the prevailing philosophy was that gov-
ernmental activity should generally be restricted to a minimum, as
early as 1924 Professor Borchard of Yale wrote of the substantial
increase in governmental activity, and concluded that this change in
activity was one of the reasons why people needed a right of re-
course to the courts for their protection. " Benefits brought to many
people by the growth of governmental activity are often also accom-
panied by some hardships and injustices. This has become increas-
ingly apparent in the wholesale condemnations of homes and busi-
ness properties for purposes of highway development. The street
of public improvement is not alone a one-way thoroughfare; and it is
desirable, from time to time to locate such injustices as may be
remediable and correct them. More persons are apt to be hurt today
than heretofore because of the government's increased physical
and mechanical activity. If persons cannot enforce rights against
the wrongdoer, then they have increasingly less protection under
our government. The recommendation that the state give this
protection to the people is simply a means of keeping up with the
changes that have occurred. It is unjust to ask one person maimed
by the state to bear himself the burden of his loss or injury when
the activity that injured him was conducted for the benefit of all the
people. The compensation to which he should be entitled as a
matter of right should be simply regarded by the state as a part of
the cost of the project by which he has suffered harm.
The federal government was slow to permit itself to be sued
in tort, but the final step was inevitable in the interests of fairness
to both claimants and members of Congress. Divesting itself of the
responsibility of attempting to adjudicate these tort claims was one
of the steps the members of Congress took to accomplish a more
efficient congressional reorganization. The following are typical
statements made by members of Congress with relation to their
efforts to be fair to claimants and by way of critique of the legislative
committee method of determining claims:
Mr. Kefauver... the ordinary injured claimant who does not
have political connections is likely not to get justice. It is a
haphazard method. We are using a forum which is not set up
12. Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 129, 229
(1924-25).
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for the giving of real consideration to the merits of private
claims bills....
The Chairman. I have often been somewhat aggrieved when a
claim, which has had consideration by the House committee and
by the House, came over to the Senate and had consideration
by the Senate Claims Committee, and then came up under
unanimous consent in the Senate, and a figure had been arrived
at that a man who was hit by a Government truck and lost a
leg ... should have $2,500, but because some Senator, who was
not a member of the committee, and only had an opportunity to
read the report as the calendar was being called thought the
amount excessive - - - I have seen the person in charge of the
bill willing to reduce the amount by $1,000 in order to obviate
the single objection which would throw the bill over and perhaps
defeat it .... [I] t seems to me obvious on the face of it the pres-
ent procedure is not the way to secure a judicial determination of
the right of private claimants.
Mr. Kefauver. Senator La Follette, at the conclusion of the
last Congress I saw this happen: A claim bill passed the House
for $5,000. I think it was a death case. The Senate allowed $500.
The Congressman who had sponsored the bill in the House
agreed to accept the reduced amount of the Senate on the theory
that the Congress was about to adjourn and unless he got it
through for $500 he feared he would not get anything. Of course,
that is not doing justice to the claimant.
The Vice Chairman. That is a case of our great Government
taking advantage of a widow who is suffering a real loss.13
The discussion continued with relation to the impact of the
legislative bodies having to determine private claims upon the
efficiency of members of Congress in the broad public service for
which they were elected:
Mr. Kefauver. As it works, the departments actually pass on
these claims. As the chairman has said, Members of Congress,
because of the stress of other matters, simply do not have time to
give them judicial consideration. So what happens is that a
claims bill is sent to the department and if the department is
against it the chances are the claims bill is not passed, and if the
department is for it the claims bill is usually passed through
both Houses. 4
Mr. Voorhis. It is too obvious to require long exposition that the
central function of any national legislature should be the de-
vising of a national legislative program with all that that im-
plies. ""
13. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Con-
gress, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 66-69 (1945).
14. Id. at 69.
15. Id. at 29.
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Senator Taylor. I am on the Claims Committee. As a new mem-
ber, it strikes me that it is absolutely a very poor proposition to
ask Senators to spend their time pouring over these claims...
you are absolutely at a loss if you have not gone through the
case yourself. So I have found that I had to go through them
personally and at a time when I was supposed to be familiarizing
myself with Dumbarton Oaks, Bretton Woods, or Manpower,
and many other things, I find I have to spend hours poring
[sic] through these claims.36
Congressional leaders also realized that if they were to be re-
lieved of private claim determination, the decisions of the courts,
after exhaustion of the right of appeal, must be final. Thus, testi-
mony before the congressional committee continued:
Mr. Kefauver. The second reason a bill of this sort has not been
passed in the past is we fear that even after the claim has been
considered by the court, some Congressman, upon the behest
of an injured person, would still try to get a private claims bill
through the Congress. That could be taken care of by providing
in the law that this would be his exclusive remedy and a claimant
should be estopped or precluded from asserting a claim in any
other way except in a court established for the consideration
of it.' 7
The result of the congressional inquiry was enactment of the
Federal Tort Claims Act as a part of the Congressional Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1946.18 President Coolidge had previously vetoed a
general court of claims bill that was passed by the 70th Congress, but
largely, it appears, because of certain administrative features in the
bill. 9 The Federal Tort Claims Act had been recommended by the
attorney general of the United States during the Franklin D. Roose-
velt administration, and after passage, it was signed by the President.
Legislation of this sort had been advocated by the American Bar
Association. It carried the support of both liberal and conservative
leaders who were studying the problem over the years. By virtue
of this statute, the federal government has now waived its immunity
from both tort and contract" suit against it; and that, in itself,
adds to a natural public expectation that the states will follow,
even though perhaps with caution.
16. Id. at 218-19.
17. Id. at 67.
18. 60 Stat. 842 (1946), as amended, 62 Stat. 982 (1948), 63 Stat. 106
(1949), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1952).
19. H.R. Rep. No. 9285, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 4836 (1929). See McGuire,
Tort Claims Against the United States, 19 Geo. L.J. 133 (1931).
20. Contract actions could be brought against the federal government in
the United States Court of Claims as early as 1855. The statute as it now
exists is known popularly as, the Tucker Act. 36 Stat. 1136 (1911), as
amended, 67 Stat. 226 (1953), 68 Stat. 1240 (1954), 28 U.S.C. § 171 (Supp.
IV 1957).
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The constitution of Minnesota provides that one's property
cannot be "taken, destroyed or damaged" without just compensa-
tion."- It gives no similar guarantee to human life. As has been
done in various other states,2 2 the Minnesota Supreme Court has
indicated that this eminent domain provision places a duty on the
legislature to provide a procedure in court for the proof of dam-
ages under the state constitution. 23 The state has singled out
proceedings for the condemnation of property in fulfillment of the
requirements of the 6onstitutional guarantee for the taking of
property.2' No fair reason exists why human life, property damage,
or destruction apart from the eminent domain process should not be
accorded the same dignity of treatment.
It should be emphasized that even if the courts should be the
instrumentality to determine liability and its amount, if any, it
would still remain within the control of the legislature to appropri-
ate the funds necessary to pay the claims. It would be expected that
any statute waiving the state's immunity would also preclude the
21. Minn. Const. art. I, § 13.
22. The federal constitutional counterpart has not been held to be self-
executing. In a number of instances, however, similar provisions in state con-
stitutions have been held to be self-executing and to constitute a waiver of
immunity from suit brought against it to enforce their terms. Woodward Iron
Co. v. Cabaniss, 87 Ala. 328, 6 So. 300 (1889) ; Campbell v. Arkansas State
Highway Comm., 183 Ark. 780, 38 S.W.2d 753 (1931) ; Rose v. State, 19
Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942) ; Board of Comm. of Logan County v. Adler,
69 Colo. 290, 194 Pac. 621 (1920); Bassett v. Swenson, 51 Ida. 256, 5
P.2d 722 (1931); People ex rel. John V. Farwell Co. v. Kelly, 361 Ill.
54, 196 N.E. 795 (1935) Pelt v. Louisana State Live Stock Sanitary Bd., 178
So. 644 (La. App. 19385 ; Parker v. State Highway Comm., 173 Miss. 213,
162 So. 162 (1935); Barker v. St Louis County, 340 Mo. 986, 104 S.W.2d
371 (1937) ; Dougherty v. Vidal, 37 N.M. 256, 21 P.2d 90 (1933) ; Morrison
v. Clackamas County, 141 Ore. 564, 18 P.2d 814 (1933) ; County of Chester v.
Brower, 117 Pa. 647, 12 Atl. 577 (1888) ; Chick Springs Water Co., Inc. v.
State Highway Dept, 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1930) ; Nelson County v.
Loving, 126 Va. 283, 101 S.E. 406 (1919) ; Johnson v. Parkersburg, 16 W.Va.
402, 37 Am. Rep. 779 (1880) ; Washington Water Power Co. v. Waters, 186
Fed. 572 (N.D. Ida. 1910).
23. ". . . as to the question of the amount of compensation, the owner of
land taken for public use has a right to require that an impartial tribunal be
provided for its determination, and [that] the government is bound in such
cases to provide such tribunal, before which both parties may meet and dis-
cuss their claims on equal terms. .. ." McMillan, J., in Langford v. County
of Ramsey, 16 Minn. 333, 339 (1870-71). At the time of this case, determina-
tion had been made by the commissioners. The Court said on this point, "It
certainly cannot be said that this is a just or equitable mode of determining
the compensation due to a citizen for property taken for public use." Id. at 340.
"So great... is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not
authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the
whole community.... The public is now considered as an individual, treating
with an individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige
the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price.... ." 1 BI. Comm.
§ 139 (Sbarswood 1879).
24. Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 117.01-45 (1947).
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right to levy execution against the state and specify that judgments
would not constitute liens against its property.
As to torts, it could well be provided for the administrative
determination of small claims within the affected state department
or agency, subject to approval by the attorney general and with the
further right of appeal to the district court. Provision for this small
tort claim procedure would give claimants an informal and inexpen-
sive method for making their claims. It ought to protect the office
of the attorney general from having to move around to handle too
many small matters all over the state. It puts an onus for prompt
investigation on the state department or agency involved, and it
provides something of public relations value to the department or
agency. If this administrative procedure should be made available,
recourse to the courts ought not to be permitted until administrative
efforts have been exhausted. There is precedent for this administra-
tive method. The federal government used it in various ways prior
to enactment of the Torts Claims Act, and a large number of claims
were permitted to be settled administratively within the armed forces
during World War II for damage and destruction caused by them.",
The Federal Tort Claims Act specifically authorized such settle-
ment of claims not exceeding $1,000.26
The more desirable result may be that the state simply waive its
immunity from suit in both contract and tort.2 7 It should be indi-
25. Statutes permitting such settlement were popularly referred to as
"gratuitous" claims statutes. See for example 57 Stat 372 (1943), as amended,
59 Stat 225 (1945), 31 U.S.C. § 223b (1952).
26. 60 Stat. 843 (1946), as amended, 63 Stat. 106 (1949), 64 Stat. 987(1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1952).
27. "If I were a member of the legislative branch of the government
considering the advisability of establishing a court of claims with tort juris-
diction or of conferring such jurisdiction upon existing tribunals as against
the state, the reasons advanced by the majority would be persuasive. Functions
now performed by the state seem to demand legislation of that character."
Loring, J., dissenting in State v. Stanley, 188 Minn. 390, 395, 247 N.W. 509,
511 (1933).
"It is certainly not in accord with American democracy to permit the
state to take private property by other than legal means and then to defend
itself by a plea of nonsuability." Gallagher, Henry M., C.J., in State v.
Bentley, 216 Minn. 146, 160, 12 N.W.2d 347, 355 (1943).
In the field of municipal corporations, courts, in veering away from the
rule of governmental non-liability, have resolved a distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions and declared that there is liability
for tortious results of the latter. This has been a judge-made escape from
obvious injustice to the public. "More than that, the decisions in each of the
States are disharmonious and disclose the inevitable chaos when courts try to
apply a rule of law that is inherently unsound. The fact of the matter is that
the theory whereby municipalities are made amenable to liability is an
endeavor, however awknvard and contradictory, to escape from the basic his-
torical doctrine of sovereign immunity." Frankfurter, J., in Indian Towing
Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955).
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cated here that in the various states such claims are handled by a
hodge-podge of different methods.2 8 If there has been a trend, it is
away from the legislative method. Constitutional restrictions affect
the procedures in some states. Some constitutions require an ad-
ministrative procedure. Those of Idaho,29 Montana, 0 Nevada,31 and
Utah 2 provide for boards consisting of the governor, secretary of
state, and attorney general who are to examine all claims before they
are submitted to the legislature. Nebraska3 3 provides for an admin-
istrative adjustment to be made by the state auditor and approved
by the secretary of state, but appeal is permitted from their rulings
to the district court. One could not fairly inflict this function upon
those officers in Minnesota in addition to their many present duties.
Even so, the Nebraska method at least paves the way to a determin-
ation according to legal right.
The Illinois Constitution provides that the state "shall never
be made defendant in any court of law or equity."34 The legislature
of that state, however, displayed an interesting anachronism by
creating what it calls a court of claims. This is not a constitutional
court in the ordinary sense. It might be regarded as a legislative or
advisory court, and its action does not affect the legislature's power
for paying claims against the state.35 Its authorized jurisdiction was
originally worded broadly, much as in the Minnesota 1955 and 1957
statutes, to try claims against the state, whether legal or equitable,
in tort or in contract, which the state "should in equity and good
conscience discharge and pay .... ,31" But this broad provision has
since been removed from the statute. Despite the strictly advisory
28. "Even so, sovereign responsibility for tort probably has already be-
come the rule rather than the exception." Davis, Tort Liability of Govern-
mental Units, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 751 (1956). Professor Davis' article is a
distinct contribution to this general subject.
29. Idaho Const., art. IV, § 18 providing that "... no claim against the
state... shall be passed upon by the legislature without first having been
considered and acted upon by said board."
30. Mont. Const, art. VII, § 20.
31. Nev. Const, art. V, § 21.
32. Utah Const., art. VII, § 13.
33. Neb. Const, art. VIII, § 9.
34. I1. Const., art. IV, § 26.
35. "The court of claims is a statutory body not provided for in the con-
stitution, and its action can have no effect upon the power of the legislature
to pay claims against the State .... The power or lack of power to appro-
priate money to pay claims depends upon the constitution and not upon the
action of the court of claims." Fergus v. Russell, 277 Ill. 20, 25, 115 N.E. 166,
167-68 (1917).
36. Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 37, §§ 427-39 (Smith-Hurd 1935). The broad pro-
vision, "should in equity and good conscience discharge and pay," has been
supplanted by the legislature with more legalistic and specific language. See
Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 37, § 439.8 (1957). Otherwise the jurisdiction of the court
has been broadened.
19581
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nature of the decisions of the Illinois court of claims, no case has
been found where the General Assembly of that state has not paid
claimants in accordance with the determinations of that court. The
court of claims law in Illinois provides that any judge of the court
may sit at any place within the state to take evidence. Approximately
one hundred cases are handled by the court each year.
It is obvious that the Illinois court of claims is somewhat of a
legislative agency, and its usefulness need not be limited to one
particular kind of case. It had jurisdiction until 1951 over claims of
state government employees arising under the workmen's com-
pensation legislation,3 7 although since that date the Industrial Com-
mission in Illinois has been handling these cases. In 1953, the legis-
lature there appropriated $150,000 to the court for the purpose of
settling claims against the state arising out of the activities of the
Illinois Coal Products Commission.
The North Carolina Constitution,38 as does the constitution of
Idaho, gives original jurisdiction to the state supreme court over
claims against the state. As indicated above, the Idaho Constitution
also provides for a board, consisting of the governor, secretary of
state, and attorney general, to examine claims; and the administra-
tive determination by this board is prerequisite to the supreme
court's assuming jurisdiction. 39 In North Carolina, on the other
hand, the legislature has authorized the Industrial Commission to
consider tort claims not in excess of $8,000.40
Constitutions of Idaho and North Carolina, then, provide forums
for the consideration of disputed claims. Yet they do not specify
procedures, and the legislatures have not designated any except as
indicated above in North Carolina. Certainly appellate courts are not
well constituted for the actual trial of cases, and they do not have
facilities if jury trial is in order. The procedure in those states is
generally to commence suit in the supreme court; after the issue
is joined the case is referred to a judge of a trial court to find as to
disputed fact questions.41 The trial judge makes his findings of
fact and conclusions of law and files them, along with a transcript
37. Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 37, § 432(6) (Smith-Hurd 1935). Later amended,
Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 37, § 439.8(A) (1957).
38. N.C. Const., art. IV, § 9. The court does not pass upon conflicting
evidence in determining facts. Calkins Dredging Co. v. State, 191 N.C. 243,
131 S.E. 665 (1926).
39. Idaho Const., art. V. § 10, art. IV, § 18. Pyke v. Steunenberg, 5 Ida.
614, 51 Pac. 614 (1,897).
40. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-291 to 300 (1951).
41. E.g., ".... in proper cases the Court may order that issues of fact be
tried in the Superior Court ... " Cohoon v. State, 201 N.C. 312, 160 S.E. 183(1931).
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of the testimony when he is directed, in the supreme court, where
the parties have the opportunity to argue further.
Three possible methods of handling governmental claims by a
court procedure might be suggested. One would be the creation
of a separate court of claims. A second would be by some board
or administrative body with the right of appeal. The third would be
by suit in district court by the usual method, with some protective
precautions.
One state court of claims has fallen by the wayside. That was
the court in West Virginia which was created in 1941 with juris-
diction over both tort and contract cases. 42 In 1953 the state trans-
ferred the duties of this court to the attorney general.43 Hearings
are now held at his office where he takes testimony, although he
is not bound by the usual rules of evidence and affidavits are not
acceptable as proof.4 4 True, the attorney general may lean over back-
wards to be fair; but the question still remains whether the integrity
of the procedure is not fairly to be questioned when the determina-
tion of rights is made by an attorney or agent of the very person
against whom the claim is made.
New York, on the other hand, has a court of claims which it
has strengthened and given added deserved prestige. The legisla-
tive method of passing upon private claims was found historically
to have led to abuses, especially with relation to construction proj-
ects.45 Primarily to remedy this evil, the New York Constitution
was amended in 1874 to forbid the legislature to audit any private
claim.'0 The legislature accordingly provided certain public officers
as a Board of Audit to perform the service.4 7 In 1883, that board
was abolished and a Board of Claims was created in its stead with
substantially the same powers.48 In 1897 this board, in turn, was
supplanted by a "court of claims" with increased jurisdiction.4 9 It
became a "board" again in 1911,"0 and once more revived as the
42. W.Va. Code Ann. §§ 1143-47 (1949). Designated "a special instru-
mentality of the legislature' and "A determination ... shall not be subjected
to appeal ... or review." Id. § 1146. The jurisdiction included that over claims
which the state "should in equity and good conscience discharge and pay."
Id. § 1147(8).
43. W.Va. Code Ann. §§ 1143-47(7) (1955).
44. Rules of Attorney General, pursuant to statute delegating to him the
function of hearing claims.
45. The Court of Claims of the State of New York (a pamphlet argu-
ment for constitutional provision for the court).
46. N.Y. Const., art. III, § 19. "The section interposed an obstacle in the
path of persons asserting unfounded claims against the state." Cayuga County
v. State, 153 N.Y. 279, 288, 47 N.E. 288, 290 (1897).
47. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1883, c. 205.
48. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1876, c. 444.
49. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1897, c. 36.
50. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1911, c. 856.
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"court" of claims in 1915.51 Thus its status from "board!' to "court"
and back to "board" again occurred over the years as new political
powers assumed control in the legislature, the change being a means
for a new administration to oust the appointees of the old.5 2 Efforts
to make the court a genuinely judicial one bore fruit, however.
It was made a constitutional court effective in January of 1950.13
Here, then, is the first suggested possibility for Minnesota-a
newly constituted court of claims from which a right of appeal
would be permitted. There may be merit in the suggestion that a
group of judges who confer together regularly and who deal
exclusively in problems involving the state would become specialists
and do a more competent job. If the court were to have exclusive
jurisdiction over both contract and tort cases, there might be
enough work to justify its existence. There is precedent for such
a court in the long-established United States Court of Claims.
In such a forum grievances could be submitted on a basis of legal
right and be defended by the state on that ground. The office of the
attorney general would have but one court with which to deal and
would not be under the threat of having to appear in many courts all
over the state at the same time. One judge could try the facts alone
on smaller cases and report to the full bench for the entire court's
decision, and the entire panel sitting together could take the place
of a jury in the larger or more important cases. This method of
handling such claims, however, would require the creation of an
entirely new judicial body with all of its consequent expenses to the
state, and a new court of claims might be regarded as surplusage
in the light of presently-available court facilities.
It is now the trend, moreover, to consolidate and unify court
systems rather than to raise new jurisdictional conflicts by the
creation of new courts. Examples of such conflicts with their con-
sequent cost and other problems to both litigants and the state
are apparent in Minnesota. Jurisdictional monetary limits in munici-
pal courts vary from court to court, and the limitation on procedural
facilities not infrequently raises questions as between the municipal
51. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1915, c. 1, 100.52. "During a period of many years, it has been the practice whenever
a change of administration has occurred to legislate out of office either the
Court of Claims or the Board of Claims, and to substitute therefor either a
Board of Claims or a Court of Claims, as the case might require. This prac-
tice has not been conducive in all cases to the best interests of the State."
Letter of Nov. 23, 1921, from Merton E. Lewis, former Attorney General of
New York.
53. N.Y. Const, art. VI, § 23. The court has jurisdiction "to hear and
determine claims against the state or by the state against the claimant or
between conflicting claimants as the legislature may provide."
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and district courts. Appeals from some municipal courts are direct
to the supreme court, but from others appeal is to the district court
for trial de novo. With the latter there is an invitation for recalcitrant
parties to employ this easy appeal as a means of strategy where no
meritorious claim or defense in fact exists. District courts attempt
to force cases within certain monetary limits into the municipal
courts in disregard of the probable constitutional right of claimants
to select their own forums for trial. The fact that appeal from probate
court is to the district court for trial de novo and perhaps with jury
means that two trials on the identical facts are often required and
are at least permitted, the appeal process inviting participants to toy
with each other in the probate court and even to delay display of
their full hand until the appeal-all with the possibility of further
appeal thereafter. The possible creation of county courts to take over
the function of municipal courts and perhaps absorb the functions of
probate courts has had its consideration among some persons in
Minnesota; and the possible lack of wisdom in trying family matters
in a wholly separate court, which has been suggested by some, be-
comes apparent because of jurisdictional conflicts that might arise.
By like token, the Temporary Commission on the Courts in New
York has unanimously concluded that the jurisdiction of the surro-
gate courts in that state should be exercised by the supreme court
in New York City and by the county courts elsewhere in the state.
It also concluded that the court of claims of New York should no
longer exist, but its functions should be exercised in the future by the
highest trial court as already constituted. The change would have
to be by constitutional amendment, of course. The annual cost of
the court of claims in New York has approximated $545,000.
Jurisdictional conflicts between it and the regularly-constituted trial
courts create complications. The court of claims does not have
equity jurisdiction; nor does it have jurisdiction over a person who
is claimed to be a joint tortfeasor with the state. Suits against the
sthte and a joint tortfeasor must be two in number, one in the court
of claims against the state for trial by the court and one in another
court against the joint tortfeasor for possible trial by jury. The two
actions cannot be consolidated. Title to land is not triable in the
court of claims, and it may not try claims against a city, town, village
or other political subdivision.
Most controversies with the state are not so intricate, important
or novel that specialists in the field are required to adjudicate them.
Many of the same questions arising between a claimant and the
state likewise arise between a claimant and a city or other political
19581
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subdivision. Handling claims against the state in a regularly-con-
stituted trial court would permit third-party actions, and could
permit the granting of equitable relief. Practice and procedure could
then be kept more uniform. As the New York Temporary Commis-
sion has stated, proper safeguards for the office of the attorney
general can certainly be provided, and the large expense of a
separate court avoided. Problems peculiar to the attorney general
are not to be captiously regarded, but they certainly are not insur-
mountable simply because trial would be in the regularly-constituted
trial courts.54 Recognizing the advantages of a separate court of
claims, the recommendation nevertheless seems inevitable that it
would be better not to establish such a court in Minnesota.
The second proposed procedure finds its example in Michigan
where judges themselves comprise a board to hear claims. The
Michigan constitution forbids the legislature to audit or allow
private claims.55 It designates the secretary of state, state treasurer,
and land office commissioner as a board for adjusting them.G Legis-
lation, though, has limited the size of the claims that may be sub-
mitted to that board. The Michigan Legislature in 1939 created
what it called a court of claims and left the administrative board to
handle only claims under $100.57 The judges of that court are
circuit court judges designated by the presiding circuit judge of the
state. The parties have the right of appeal to the supreme court.
This method of operation may be adaptable to Minnesota. As-
signments could be made by the chief justice with provision for
rotation of assignments to obviate placing too much burden on any
one judge or conflicting too much with calendar assignments in
certain districts. This method, again, would restrict the number of
trials at any one time so as not to require the attorney general's office
to make many appearances simultaneously all over the state.
The third suggestion, and that favored by this writer, is that
the state simply waive its immunity from suit against it in tort and
contract; suit to be brought in the presently-existing courts as is
done between private parties. Suit is allowed against the state with
varying limitations in at least eighteen states, original jurisdiction
being in the supreme court in three of them.58 Certainly, this fact
54. The Plan of the Temporary Commission on the Courts for a Simpli-
fied State-Wide Court System (1956).
55. Mich. Const., art. V, § 34.
56. Id., art. VI, § 20. To ". . . adjust all claims against the state not
otherwise provided for by general law."
57. Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.108 (1948).
58. Ariz. Code Ann. § 27-101 (1939) (on contract and tort) ; Cal. Gov.
Code §§ 16041-54 (1945) (on express contract and tort after claim is dis-
allowed administratively); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 7781, 8297 (1949) (for
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together with the existing law on the federal level is illustrative to
show that litigation against the government is not novel. A more
serious problem would seem to relate to the facilities of the attorney
general's office. However, the federal government faced this prob-
len and private industry has always been obliged to do so. One
possibility would be for a controlled calendar, perhaps' under the
direction of the chief justice of the supreme court, to help limit the
number of places in which the attorney general's staff would be
obliged to appear at any particular time. If it is necessary to in-
crease the size of the attorney general's office, then that should be
done. It might be necessary to recognize increasingly the position of
the attorney general as head of a centralized legal system for the
state and have some of these cases defended by county attorneys
under his direction. This feature of the state's present inquiry at
least is not unsolvable.
Practice under the Federal Tort Claims Act is for trial to
be by the court without a jury. This suggests a feeling on the part of
some people that judges might be more predictable and they might
be more conservative in their allowances than jurors5 Certainly, it
should be in order for the attorney general to settle cases, and, for
the protection of the state, court approval of the settlements could
be provided for.
negligent operation of state-owned vehicles, but in 1957, the legislature sub-
mitted to the people a constitutional amendment that "claims against the state
shall be resolved in such a manner as may be provided by law." Conn. Pub.
Act, 1957, No. 615.); Idaho Const., art. V, § 10 (original jurisdiction in
supreme court); Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 37, §§ 439.1-25 (1957) (suit in court of
claims on contract or tort) ; Ind. Ann. Stat §§ 4-1501 to 1507 (Burns 1946)
(in superior court of Marion County sitting as a court of claims on money
demands arising in law or equity on express or implied contracts) ; Mass.
Ann. Laws c. 258, §§ 1-4A (1956) (in superior court on all claims at law
or in equity); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 647.25, 691.108 (1948) (in court of
claims in contract and tort) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 161.03(17)-(20) (1946) (on
highway contracts); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 4387-89 (1957) (on a liquidated
claim which state auditor is empowered, but refuses, to allow) ; Neb. Const.,
art. VIII, § 9 (certain claims, including those on contract, express or implied,
sued in Lancaster County); N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 23, N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act (in
court of claims on contract, express or implied, or tort) ; N.C. Const, art. IV,
§ 9 (in supreme court) ; N.D. Rev. Code §§ 32-1202 to 1204 (1943) (title
to property or on contract) ; S.D. Code § 33.0604 (1939) (complaint filed in
supreme court, referred to senior circuit judge in any county sitting as com-
missioner of claims, in contract and tort) ; Va. Code Ann. § 8-752 (1957) (on
claims disallowed by comptroller); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.92.010 (1956) (in
superior court of Thurston County on any claims) ; Wis. Stat. §§ 285.01-06
(1955) (suit allowed after legislature disallows claim).
59. But see Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). It
was there said: "Of course, when dealing with a statute subjecting the
Government to liability for potentially great sums of money, this Court must
not promote profligacy by careless construction. Neither should it as a self-
constituted guardian of the Treasury import immunity back into a statute
designed to limit it." Frankfurter, J., Id. at 69.
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Since the government conducts its activities all over the state,
it ought to be suable all over the state without the necessity of
aggrieved persons having to go for trial to, perhaps, the judicial
district in which the capitol is situated. One should not be denied
convenient access to the courts simply because the state is involved
and because he was injured in Koochiching, St. Louis, or Lyon
county where he resides and where operations of the state occur.
Burdens on claimants to appear personally at a trial in a distant
county could be greater than the value to them if determination
were to be by a legislative committee where proof by affidavit could
be permitted. Venue should always be available in the county of
the capitol, but should also be available in other districts consistent
with rules as they exist between private parties and subject to such
change of venue as usual rules provide.
III.
Effort has been made in this article to indicate that there is no
well-established, single, traditional process for determining claims
against governments, even though determination by legislative com-
mittee has been the rule in Minnesota until 1955. At least the
legislature has opened the way for a fresh consideration of this
problem free of personality conflicts. One is compelled to the con-
clusion that, as between private litigants, so as between a private
claimant and the government, determination of a legal controversy
is a judicial process. 60 Citizens have a moral right to expect that it
will be so handled. It is submitted that the preferable method of
handling claims against the state is for the state to come out from
behind its veil of immunity from suit in both contract and tort,
except that provision might well be specified for the administrative
handling of smaller tort claims with the right of a claimant to appeal.
60. "Following the masterful leadership of Professor Edwin M. Borch-
ard, nearly every commentator who considers the subject vigorously asserts
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity must go. The Supreme Court in 1939
observed that 'the present climate of opinion . . . has brought governmental
immunity from suit into disfavor.' The attitude that is now dominant was
expressed nearly a century ago by President Lincoln in his first annual
message to Congress: 'It is as much the duty of Government to render promptjustice against itself in favor of citizens as it is to administer the same be-
tween private individuals. The investigation and adjudication of claims in
their nature belong to the judicial department'" Davis sipra note 27, at 753.
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